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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. DID THE PROBATE COURT ERR IN REFUSING IO 
RECOGNIZE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY ROSALIND CAZARES? 
Standard of Review?, The substance of Appellant Rosalind Cazares' 
claim is that tik. rroDai^ t. ourt erreu wii-ji: .; IVL:>CL. to recognize her 
no particular deference and are reviewed for correctness. Doelle v. Bradley, 
784P.2d : 1 76, 117^Ut. 1989). 
II DID THE PROBATE COURT ERR IN APPROVING A 
SETTI EMENT IN TIIH ANCILLARY KENNEDY ACTION? 
Standam;./ Keview. On review, an appellate court states tne ucis n, a 
ligl it n lost favorable to tl le trie il c c )i i r t ' s : ! : ii I in lgs a,i id decisioi is oi 'law ai e 
reviewed for correctness. Doc!'< •• fh\/J;r\ ^."•;\. • . ' •- . ir i 's 
findings of fact following an evidentiary hearing in an estate proceeding are 
reviewed based upon a clear!) erroneous standard, Matter of Estate of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (I Jt. 10F0). An appellant must marshal the 
evidence in support of tlle findings and then demonstrate that, despite this 
evidence, the trial cour;'- ;Hidings are so lacking in support as to be "against 
tl ic clear weight of the evidence," tl: n is I i laking tl len I "clearly en o.i ieoi is." h L 
(Internal citations omitl ed). " Wh( ;ther the f;: icts 1 v< ive been foi ind by ; I ji iry c >r 
a judge, appellants should recognize that the burden of overturning factual 
findings is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases 
submitted on disputed facts." Id. A trial court 's statements or conclusions 
<>! law are accorded ho particulai deference and are reviewed for correctness. 
DID THE P R O K A I Jb U J L R l LRK 1A \ ALl JING I I IE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE? 
Standard of Review. Implicit in the Appellants' argument is that the 
Probatae Court erred in determining what evidence was relevant. Trial 
courts are afforded considerable discretion in deciding whether evidence is 
.:\^^,v . .....'./•; \Ki^n .. Behrers, 5>~ r .-.• .": • i •  d i s t r i c t 
( :oi i.i 1 ' s fn idii lgs of fact followii lg ai I evidenl iary I learii ig ii i ai :i esl ate 
proceeding are reviewed based i ipoi i a clearly en oneoi is stai idard Matter of 
Estate of Bartell, supra. An appellant must marshal the evidence in suppoi I 
of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the trial Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight 
of the evidence," thus making them "clearly erroneous." Id 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
No constitutional provisions are implicated. 
The following statutory provisions within Utah's Probate Code are 
relevant to the controversy: 
Section 75-3-617 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides:1 
UA special administrator appointed by order of the court in any formal 
proceeding has the power of a general personal representative except 
as limited in the appointment and duties as prescribed in the order. 
The appointment may be for a specified time, to perform particular 
acts, or on other terms as the court may direct." 
Section 75-3-703 provides: 
"(1) A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the 
standard of care applicable to trustees as described by Section 75-7-
902. A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute 
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any 
probated and effective will and this code and as expeditiously and 
efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall 
use the authority conferred upon him by this code, the terms of the 
will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which he is party for the 
best interests of successors to the estate. 
(2) A personal representative shall not be surcharged for acts of 
administration or distribution if the conduct in question was 
authorized at the time. Subject to other obligations of administration, 
an informally probated will is authority to administer and distribute 
Unless otheiwise indicated, all futuie lefeiences shall be to Utah's Piobate Code, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, without full citation 
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the estate according to its terms. An order of appointment of a 
personal representative, whether issued in informal or formal 
proceedings, is authority to distribute apparently intestate assets to the 
heirs of the decedent if, at the time of distribution, the personal 
representative is not aware of a pending testacy proceeding, a 
proceeding to vacate an order entered in an earlier testacy proceeding, 
a formal proceeding questioning his appointment or fitness to 
continue, or a supervised administration proceeding. Nothing in this 
section affects the duty of the personal representative to administer 
and distribute the estate in accordance with the rights of claimants, the 
surviving spouse, any minor and dependent children, and any 
pretermitted child of the decedent as described elsewhere in this code. 
(3) Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the 
decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this 
state at his death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the 
courts of this state and courts of any other jurisdiction as his decedent 
had immediately prior to death." 
Section 75-3-704 provides: 
aA personal representative shall proceed expeditiously with the 
settlement and distribution of a decedent's estate and except as 
otherwise specified or ordered in regard to a supervised personal 
representative, do so without adjudication, order, or direction of the 
court, but may invoke the jurisdiction of the court in proceedings 
authorized by this code to resolve questions concerning the estate or 
its administration." 
Section 75-3-710 provides: 
"Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has 
the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute 
owner would have, in trust, however, for the benefit of the creditors 
and others interested in the estate. This power may be exercised 
without notice, hearing, or order of court, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by this code." 
Section 75-3-714 provides: 
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"Except as restricted or otherwise provided by this code, by the will or 
by an order in a formal proceeding and subject to the priorities stated 
in Section 75-3-902, a personal representative, acting reasonably for 
the benefit of the interested persons, may properly: 
(1) retain assets owned by the decedent pending distribution or 
liquidation including those in which the representative is personally 
interested or which are otherwise improper for trust investment; 
(2) receive assets from fiduciaries, or other sources; 
(3) perform, compromise, or refuse performance of the decedent's 
contracts that continue as obligations of the estate, as he may 
determine under the circumstances. In performing enforceable 
contracts by the decedent to convey or lease land, the personal 
representative, among other possible courses of action, may: 
(a) execute and deliver a deed of conveyance for cash payment of all 
sums remaining due or the purchaser's note for the sum remaining due 
secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on the land; or 
(b) deliver a deed in escrow with directions that the proceeds, when 
paid in accordance with the escrow agreement, be paid to the 
successors of the decedent, as designated in the escrow agreement: 
(4) satisfy written charitable pledges of the decedent irrespective of 
whether the pledges constituted binding obligations of the decedent or 
were properly presented as claims, if in the judgment of the personal 
representative the decedent would have wanted the pledges completed 
under the circumstances; 
(5) if funds are not needed to meet debts and expenses currently 
payable and are not immediately distributable, deposit or invest liquid 
assets of the estate, including money received from the sale of other 
assets, in federally insured interest-bearing accounts, readily 
marketable secured loan arrangements, or other prudent investments 
which would be reasonable for use by trustees generally; 
(6) acquire or dispose of an asset, including land in this or another 
state, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale; and manage, 
develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or 
abandon an estate asset; 
(7) make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings 
or other structures, demolish any improvements, or raze existing or 
erect new party walls or buildings; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(8) subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; make or obtain 
the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries; adjust differences in 
valuation on exchange or partition by giving or receiving 
considerations; or dedicate easements to public use without 
consideration; 
(9) enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee, with or 
without option to purchase or renew, for a term within or extending 
beyond the period of administration; 
(10) enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of 
minerals or other natural resources or enter into a pooling or 
unitization agreement; 
(11) abandon property when, in the opinion of the personal 
representative, it is valueless, is so encumbered, or is in condition that 
it is of no benefit to the estate; 
(12) vote stocks or other securities in person or by general or limited 
proxy; 
(13) pay calls, assessments, and other sums chargeable or accruing 
against or on account of securities, unless barred by the provisions 
relating to claims; 
(14) hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without 
disclosure of the interest of the estate but the personal representative 
is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the security so 
held; 
(15) insure the assets of the estate against damage, loss, and liability 
and himself against liability as to third persons; 
(16) borrow money with or without security to be repaid from the 
estate assets or otherwise; and advance money for the protection of 
the estate; 
(17) effect a fair and reasonable compromise with any debtor or 
obligor, or extend, renew, or in any manner modify the terms of any 
obligation owing to the estate. If the personal representative holds a 
mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of another person, he 
may, in lieu of foreclosure, accept a conveyance or transfer of 
encumbered assets from the owner thereof in satisfaction of the 
indebtedness secured by lien; 
(18) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the personal 
representative, and other expenses incident to the administration of the 
estate; 
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(19) sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; and 
consent, directly or through a committee or other agent, to the 
reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a 
corporation or other business enterprise; 
(20) allocate items of income or expense to either estate income or 
principal, as permitted or provided by law; 
(21) employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment 
advisers, or agents, even if they are associated with the personal 
representative, to advise or assist the personal representative in the 
performance of his administrative duties; act without independent 
investigation upon their recommendations; and instead of acting 
personally, employ one or more agents to perform any act of 
administration, whether or not discretionary; 
(22) prosecute or defend claims or proceedings in any jurisdiction for 
the protection of the estate and of the personal representative in the 
performance of his duties; 
(23) sell, mortgage, or lease any real or personal property of the estate 
or any interest in it for cash, credit, or for part cash and part credit, 
and with or without security for unpaid balances; 
(24) continue any unincorporated business or venture in which the 
decedent was engaged at the time of his death: 
(a) in the same business form for a period of not more than four 
months from the date of appointment of a general personal 
representative if continuation is a reasonable means of preserving the 
value of the business including good will; 
(b) in the same business form for any additional period of time that 
may be approved by order of the court in a formal proceeding to 
which the persons interested in the estate are parties; or 
(c) throughout the period of administration if the business is 
incorporated by the personal representative and if none of the 
probable distributees of the business who are competent adults object 
to its incorporation and retention in the estate; 
(25) incorporate any business or venture in which the decedent was 
engaged at the time of his death; 
(26) provide for exoneration of the personal representative from 
personal liability in any contract entered into on behalf of the estate; 
(27) satisfy and settle claims and distribute the estate as provided in 
this code. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE. 
This is a contentious probate case spanning nearly fourteen years, 
spawning numerous ancillary lawsuits and proceedings before the Third 
Judicial District Court, and Utah's Appellate Courts. Following years of 
litigation, the Estate's Special Administrator and the litigants in one 
remaining lawsuit, the Kennedy Action, resolved their differences through a 
settlement that was subsequently approved by the Probate Court in this case. 
The Appellants' current arguments on appeal were thoroughly considered 
and rejected by the Probate Court in this case. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The probate of the Estate of Rosemary Cosby was initiated with the 
filing of an informal Application for Appointment of Personal 
Representative by Robert C. Cosby (surviving spouse of the decedent) on 
February 11, 1997, with the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County. Following the appointment of Robert C. Cosby to serve as personal 
representative, Rosalind Cazares (daughter of the decedent) sought to have 
Robert C. Cosby removed as personal representative and to have herself 
appointed as personal representative. The Probate Court subsequently 
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appointed Robert C. Cosby and Rosalind Cazares to act jointly as personal 
representatives of the Estate. The probate case is referred to herein as the 
"Probate Case" and during the time relevant to this Appeal, was assigned to 
Judge L.A. Dever. 
On February 18, 1999, Rosalind Cazares filed suit against Robert C. 
Cosby alleging breach of fiduciary duty and defalcation of the Estate. Annie 
Lois Johnson was named as a co-defendant in that action. This matter was 
brought in Third District Court. Due to its length, various judges were 
assigned over the years and the last assigned judge was the Honorable John 
Paul Kennedy. Thus, this matter is referred to as the "Kennedy Action." 
Because Robert C. Cosby and Rosalind Cazares were unable to agree 
and act jointly on behalf of the Estate, Judge Dever, in the Probate Case, 
subsequently ordered that an independent third party be appointed to serve 
as personal representative or special administrator. On May 23, 2006, 
attorney Lee S. McCullough, Jr., of the law firm Callister Nebeker & 
McCullough, was appointed by the Probate Court as Special Administrator 
of the Estate. 
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During the course of proceedings in the Probate Case, both Robert 
Cosby and Rosalind Cazares filed inventories with the estate. Unable to 
agree upon what properties were to be included, Judge Scott Daniels was 
appointed by the Probate Court as special master to determine the real and 
personal property of the Estate. Following a two day hearing in July 2006, 
involving the heirs and interested parties, including Appellants, Judge 
Daniels filed his report with the Probate Court, which was subsequently 
approved by the Probate Court on August 11, 2006, without objection. 
Nevertheless, Appellants pressed for a further hearing regarding the personal 
property of the Estate and the Probate Court conducted a further three-day 
evidentiary hearing, December 1-3, 2008, and subsequently issued Findings 
of Fact and an Order and Judgment regarding personal property of the 
Estate. 
In the Kennedy Action, the Special Administrator was ultimately able 
to negotiate a Settlement Agreement with Robert C. Cosby and Lois 
Johnson, pursuant to which they were to pay the Estate the sum of $200,000 
and relinquish various claims they had against the Estate in the Probate Case 
valued in excess of $200,000. Following numerous evidentiary and legal 
hearings, Judge Dever determined in the Probate Case that: 
" See Statement of Fact, ^ 3 and 4. A comparison of these inventories discloses a wide divergence of views 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Rosalind Cazares had no interest in the Estate; 
B. The Settlement Agreement was just and reasonable; 
C. Based on the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing 
of December 1-3, 2008, the value of the household furnishings of the Estate 
was determined by the court to be $11,585, and the total value of all 
personal property, excluding cash, was less than $60,000. 
D. A final accounting could be filed and approved, and following a 
proper distribution, the Estate could be closed. 
Rosalind Cazares and Ernest Walton filed a Notice of Appeal to the 
Utah State Supreme Court on January 28, 2010. On March 1, 2010, this 
matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
C. DISPOSITION BELOW. 
The Probate Court recognized that Rosalind Carzares' interests in the 
estate had been executed upon and sold; and, therefore, she had no further 
interests in the estate. The Probate Court conducted an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the personal property of the estate and issued Findings and an 
Order and Judgment. The Special Administrator and the litigants in the 
Kennedy Action then entered into a Settlement Agreement resolving all 
claims in the Kennedy Action. The Probate Court subsequently approved 
legaiding the natuie and extent of piopeity to be included within the Estate Digitized by the H ward W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark L w School, BYU. 
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the Settlement Agreement, approved a final accounting, and closed the 
estate. 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
The Appellants have failed to meaningfully compile an adequate 
record on appeal. For example, no transcripts were prepared for significant 
hearings as required by Rule 11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. Further, the Appellants 
failed to appropriately cite to the record for their factual assertions as 
required by Rule 24(a)(7) and (9) U.R.A.P., and failed to comply with other 
appellate rules. It is not incumbent upon the Appellee to supply an 
appropriate and adequate record, Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 194 
P.2d 847, 849 (Ut. App. 1990)(non-jury trial), and, therefore, responding to 
a defective record by Appellants is difficult, if not impossible. Under these 
circumstances it would be entirely appropriate for the Court to dismiss this 
appeal under Rule 24(k) U.R.A.P. See Hampton v. Professional Title 
Services, 242 P3d 796 (Ut. App. 2010). 
Nevertheless, Appellee will attempt to provide the Court with an 
appropriate and accurate review of the facts with the limited record available 
on appeal. In the Statement of Facts section of the Appellants' Opening 
Brief, the Appellants' version of the facts are often argumentative and 
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conclusory in nature rather than being objectively factual. Other "facts" 
cited by Appellants are irrelevant to the issues presented by this appeal and 
serve only to confuse the matter. 
The Appellee submits that the following Statement of Facts is 
supported by the record or is uncontroverted: 
Part A: General Facts Related to The Estate of Rosemary Cosby. 
1. Rosemary "Mama" Cosby died intestate on January 4, 1997. 
She was survived by her husband of some twenty-two years, Robert C. 
Cosby; had four children from a prior relationship, Pamela Cosby, Debra 
Cosby, Rosalind Cazares, and Ernest Walton; and, and two adopted sons, 
Sammy and Demetrius Cosby. Demetrius Cosby subsequently died April 7, 
1999 and his interest devolved to Robert Cosby by intestacy. 
2. Robert C. Cosby was appointed personal representative of the 
Estate on February 11, 1997. (Record, 22). 
3. On June 3, 1998, Robert Cosby filed a preliminary accounting 
(Record, 47-48) and, on August 3, 1998, filed an Estate Inventory (Record, 
63-68). 
4. Rosalind Cazares was subsequently appointed to serve with 
Robert C. Cosby as co-personal representatives of the Estate on January 27, 
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1999. (Record, 168-169). Subsequently, she also filed an Estate Inventory 
on September 14, 2000. (Record, 473-478). 
5. On February 18, 1999, Rosalind Cazares, in her capacity as co-
personal representative of the Estate, filed suit on behalf of the Estate against 
Robert C. Cosby, Lois Johnson, Chase Manhattan Mortgage Company, 
Headlands Mortgage Company, Headland Home Equity Loan Trust, United 
Security Financial and John Does 1-10, Case No. 990902004, filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, referred to herein as the 
"Kennedy Action."3 (Brief of Appellant, p. 1, If 6). 
6. The Kennedy Action, with the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, 
then presiding, was tried before a jury from January 4 through January 7, 
2005. Rosalind Cazares was represented by Edward W. McBride. The jury 
awarded damages against Cosby and Johnson in the amount of $159,000.00 
each and punitive damages in the amount of $425,000.00. As a result of a 
stipulation between the parties in which the jury's award of actual damages 
was determined to be in error, the actual damages were reduced to 
$66,174.05 as to each Defendant, and upon motion by Cosby and Johnson, 
the Court remitted the punitive damage award to $325,000.00. 
All Defendants other than Robert C. Cosby and Lois Johnson were ultimately dismissed from the 
Kennedy Case. 
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7. Following the trial in the Kennedy Action, Defendants Robert 
C. Cosby and Lois Johnson timely filed post-trial motions on various issues, 
including motions to revise and reconsider under Rules 54 & 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, motions for fees and costs were filed 
by attorneys representing Ms. Cazares in that action. 
8. Robert Cosby and Rosalind Cazares were both removed as 
personal representatives of the Estate by the Court in the probate case on 
July 26, 2005. 
9. On May 23, 2006, Lee S. McCullough, Jr. ("Special 
Administrator") was appointed by the Probate Court as Special 
Administrator of the Estate. (Record, 119-120). 
10. As part of his duties, the Special Administrator was assigned 
the responsibility of retaining counsel and representing the Estate of 
Rosemary Cosby in the Kennedy Action. Accordingly, the Special 
Administrator, on behalf of the Estate, became the Plaintiff in the Kennedy 
Action. (Record, 1119).4 
11. Notwithstanding the Probate Court's appointment of a Special 
Administrator, Rosalind Cazares filed lawsuits against Robert Cosby, Lois 
The Letteis of Special Administiation piovide that the Special Administiatoi shall lepiesent the estate "in 
conjunction with the judgment obtained on behalf of the estate against Robeit C Cosby and Lois Johnson 
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Johnson, their attorneys, and others claiming, among other things, breaches 
of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, abuse of process, and fraud in the 
following actions filed in the Third Judicial District Court: 
a. Rosalind Cazares v. Annie L. Johnson, Faith Temple 
Pentecostal Church, United Security Financial I. Bruce 
Reading and Scalley, Reading, Bates, Hanson & 
Rasmussen, Civil No. 070905773, before Judge Peuler 
("the Peuler Action"). 
b. Rosalind Cazares v. Robert Cosby, Individually and as 
former Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Rosemary Cosby, Civil No. 070901707, before Judge 
Tyrone E. Medley (the "Medley Action"). 
Following Motions for Summary Judgment, these actions were dismissed 
with prejudice by Judges Peuler and Medley in 2008. 
Part B. Facts Related To Settlement of the Kennedy Action, 
11. The Probate Court was not unfamiliar with the claims and 
circumstances underlying the Kennedy Action, the Peuler Action and the 
Medley Action. The Probate Court was aware of the following facts as 
summarized by the Special Administrator in his written response to the 
Appellants' objection to the settlement: 
As noted in paiagiaph 5, mfia, at that time, a juiy veidict had alieady been lendeied Howevei, timely 
post-tnal motions weie pending 
In fact, all attorneys of lecoid, including Ms Cazaies' attorney, continuously advised the Piobate Couit as 
to the status of the ancillaiy pioceedings when dealing with othei motions 01 matteis befoie the Piobate 
Couit 
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a. In 2007, the Court presiding over the Kennedy Action 
had reconsidered and revised the judgment rendered against Cosby and 
Johnson reducing the actual damages from $66,174 (each) to $24,174 (each) 
and reducing the amount of punitive damages from $330,000.00 (each) to 
$120,870 (each) - or a total (actual plus punitive damages) of about 
$300,000. (Comments of Special Administrator on Proposed Settlement, 
Record, 6337-6345 at p. 3, If 10).6 
b. Rosalind Cazares had already moved to intervene in the 
Kennedy Action once, and that Motion was denied. (Reply of Special 
Administrator to Objections to Settlement Proposal, Record, 6454-6458 p. 2, 
Record, 6456).7 
c. Robert Cosby's claims, as an heir of the Probate Estate, 
exceeded $200,000.00. (Comments of Special Administrator on Proposed 
Settlement, Record, 6337-6345 at p. 4, If 16.) 
6
 The Motion to Revise and Reconsider the tual court's decision in the Kennedy Action were filed and 
response bnefs weie laigely diafted befoie appointment of the Special Administiatoi by Rosalind Cazaies' 
counsel, Edwaid W McBnde, Ji , and Judge Kennedy allowed Mr McBude to present aigument on the 
issues piesented in that Motion The decision to levise and leconsidei the tual court's luhng was the 
second time actual and punitive damages had been reduced in the Kennedy Action, leaving a somewhat 
tenuous lecoid foi an) appeal of the tual court's onginal i tiling 
While it does not appeal on lecoid in this case, the Court piesidmg ovei the Kennedy Action held that the 
Motion to Intervene filed by Rosalind Cazaies in 2009 was lendeied moot by the settlement of the case and 
the Kennedy Action was dismissed, with piejudice, on Januaiy 6, 2010, and no appeal was taken It is, at 
best, questionable whethei that case can be levived by any action taken m this appeal, which lendeis the 
Appellant's challenges to what should have happened in the Kennedy case moot 
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d. Under the proposed settlement, in return for dismissal of 
the Kennedy Action and a release of claims, Cosby and Johnson were to pay 
the estate $200,000 and Robert Cosby was waiving his $200,000 in claims 
against the Estate. (Comments of Special Administrator on Proposed 
Settlement, Record, 6337-6345 atpp 4-5, U 16.). 
e. In the event that the Kennedy Action was appealed and 
the Estate did not prevail, the Estate would be left insolvent by about 
$424,477; if it succeeded in winning the appeal, the Estate would be 
insolvent by about $29,477; and, if the Estate settled the Kennedy action 
under the proposed settlement (which, in part, provided a waiver of Robert 
Cosby's claims as heir of the Estate) the Estate was insolvent by about 
$82,943. (Comments of Special Administrator on Proposed Settlement, 
Record, 6337-6345 at p. 4-5, f 16.)8 
f. Heirs of the probate estate holding at least 91.667 % of 
the Estate supported the settlement and did not want to move for a new trial 
The Appellants complain that the Special Administiatoi should not have lecommended appioval of the 
action because "his fnm" leceived "almost all of the money " Bnef of Appellants at p 4 In fact, ovei 
$100,000 00 in the Estate of Rosemaiy Cosby was used to pay Edwaid Ganett, Edwaid McBnde and Paul 
Moxley - each of whom were counsel that had lepiesented Rosalind Cazaies in hei capacity as co-peisonal 
lepiesentative of the Estate (Comments of Special Administiatoi on Pioposed Settlement, R 6337 - 6345 
at p4 paia 16 ) 
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in the Kennedy Action.9 (Reply of Special Administrator to Objections to 
Settlement Proposal, Record, 6454-6458 p. 2, R. 6455).10 
12. On June 22, 2009, Appellant Ernest Walton filed a one page 
objection to the proposed settlement stating simply that he objected to the 
settlement (Record, p. 6333) without elaborating exactly why. 
13. On June 25, 2009 Appellant Rosalind Cazares mailed to the 
Special Administrator an "Objection to Robert Cosby's Settlement 
Proposal" stating simply that "Rosalind Cazares submits her objection to 
Robert Cosby's settlement proposal. The Estate is entitled to a new trial on 
the issues contained in the attached Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s 
Motion to Intervene and for new trial." 
14. The Probate Court was aware that, during the course of the 
proceedings, the Appellants raised numerous "misconduct allegations" of 
breach of fiduciary duty, perjury, fraud, and other claims against Robert 
Only Appellant Einest Walton, who had an 8 33% mteiest in the Estate opposed the settlement, although 
he did not desire an appeal 01 new trial in the Kennedy Action While Appellant Cazaies also opposed the 
settlement, she had no mteiest 01 standing to complain Howevei, even if one weie to considei hei mteiest, 
8 33%, hens holding 83 44% of the Estate still suppoited the settlement 
At the time of the heanng on appioval of the settlement, Appellant Rosalind Cazares' mteiest in the 
Estate had been lost at execution sale 
Hei objection does not appeal in the lecoid on appeal and the Appellees have no knowledge of whethei 
it was evei filed with the Couit Regaidless, hei objection was pieniised on an aigument that a motion foi a 
new ti ml should have been puisued in the Kennedy Action (which, at the time, was alieady a decade old) 
because the Estate might have had bettei success undei a new amended complaint - adding new claims and 
parties undei a questionable bioad and nebulous conspnacy theoiy—even though a juiy tual had alieady 
occuned and post tual motions weie pending 
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Cosby, Lois Johnson, their attorneys, and others, directly in the Probate 
Court as well as before Judge Peuler and Judge Medley in the Peuler and 
Medley Actions. And, as evidenced by the Order of the Probate Court, 
following a hearing on June 16, 2009 (Record, 6498-6502),12 the Probate 
Court found such allegations to be entirely without merit and, in fact, 
awarded attorneys fees against Rosalind Cazares in favor of Annie Lois 
Johnson and other recipients of Rosalind Cazares' "misconduct allegations." 
(Order Regarding Hearing on June 16, 2009 (Record, 6498-6502 at p. 3- R. 
6501). 
15 The Probate Court was also aware that Rosalind Cazares had 
sued Robert Cosby, Lois Johnson, their attorneys, and others in Peuler 
Action and the Medley Action during the pendency of this probate case and 
both had been dismissed, with prejudice, following summary judgment 
motions. (Comments of Special Administrator on Proposed Settlement, 
Record, 6337-6345 at p. 2, If 10 and 11.) 
16 The Probate Court conducted a hearing on the proposed 
settlement of the Kennedy Action on September 1, 2009, at which time the 
" Appellants did not file a tiansciipt of the June 16, 2009 heaiing oi otheiwise piovide any challenge to the 
Piobate Court's lulingaftei that heaiing (01 any way that this Court, on appeal, could leview the decision) 
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Appellants presented their perspectives on the settlement. Rosalind 
Cazares was represented, at the 1 learing by Edward W, McBride, Jr., and 
En lesl ty altoi 1 was pi esent,pro se, \ m. i . ^ . i i . i --ml specincaii} i.-unu 
that tl. le " effect, of the Settle.!.. 1 iei it Proposal i ipoi i tl le ii iterests of tl ie 1 leii s, 
creditors and other person^ * •-•* ^-.'..^h " j ^ e-. 1 
Administrator was ordered to accept the Settlement Proposal on behalf of the 
Estate. (Record, Docket Entry 1 2/31/09). 
1 7 In the Probate Court's Order approving the settlement the 
aiv. •• . .••-•,;.!. .;:icr aiiu m*;. ii YNUS unfortunate that the disputes 
hriwcvn -1;. \ir1--- N
 : - f i - •. • .•..;:.;.. -. -,. •• includii lg the 
Appellants but concluded thai the settlement was a "reasonable resolution" 
of the disputes that would allow closing the estate and that, even were the 
•\ \^\\i.. ,.]•' ••**.. ,,:•.-v.-,>i:i iiuaiivw- •v^L- . ' • • ;>hi ) i n c r e a s e a t t o r n e y ' s 
f e e s a n d — • '• ,
 x . >.. :, < i, .. . •,.- ,„. \ > )t 
; Sometime prior to the hearing conducted by the Probate Court 
approving of the settlement on September 22, 2009. Pamela Cosby had 
;- : : . . ' • a/.art>. micrcsi^ iri me 1,state tnrough execution of 
No transcript of that hearing lias been presented on appeal. 
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a judgment. See appeal in Cosby v. Cazares, 2010 Ut. App. 269 (Ut. App. 
2010) (Addendum A). 
19. The Probate Court was aware of the Cosby v. Cazares action. 
On April 10, 2009, Pamela Cosby acquired, through foreclosure, all interests 
of her sister, Rosalind Cazares, in the Rosemary Cosby Estate. On October 
27, 2009, following the September 1, 2009 hearing in the probate case—but 
before Judge Dever issued his December 29, 2009 decision—Judge Hilder 
had ruled "all of Rosalind Cazares' interest in the Estate of Rosemary 
Cosby, Civ. No. 973900220ES are quieted in Pamela Cosby subject only to 
the interest of the Inheritance Funding Company as that claim is disclosed in 
the probate action," 
Part C: Facts Relating To Evaluation of the Estate's Personal Property. 
20. On June 22, 2006, retired Judge Scott Daniels accepted 
appointment by the Probate Court as Special Master to take evidence 
regarding the personal property in the Estate. (Record, 1132-1133). 
21. On July 6, 2006 and July 10, 2006, hearings were held before 
Judge Daniels to review the property to be included in the Estate. Judge 
Daniels' findings were submitted to the Court in the Report of Special 
Master. (Addendum B, Record, 1248-1259). 
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22. At a hearing in the probate case on August 11, 2006, Judge 
Daniels' report was approved by Judge Dever with all parties present in 
Court and no objection to his report was lodged by any of the parties. 
(Addendum C, Record, 1909-1919). 
23. Following a hearing held before the Probate Court on 
December 1-3, 2008, in which Edward W. McBride, as counsel of record for 
Rosalind Cazares, presented additional evidence regarding the personal 
property includable in the Estate, the Probate Court determined that, based 
on the evidence presented, the personal property, excluding cash, was less 
than $60,000. (Record, 5922-5926). 
24. Following the settlement, and final accounting and distribution, 
the probate estate was closed. (Docket Entry 12/31/09). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
After years of contentious litigation instigated by Ms. Cazares, the 
liquid assets of the Estate were depleted. Ms. Cazares' claims, that personal 
property in the estate exceeded one million dollars, and personal property 
had been stolen from the estate, were tried numerous times and were 
rejected. The only significant asset remaining was the claim being pursued 
in the Kennedy Action. Even though a jury verdict favorable to the Estate 
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had been entered, post-trial motions significantly reduced the amount of the 
verdict. More importantly, the verdict was vigorously attacked by 
Defendants Cosby and Johnson and an imminent appeal was threatened. In 
the view of the Special Administrator, one realistic outcome of an appeal 
was that a complete vacating of the jury verdict and a remand for a new trial 
could occur. 
Given the complexities of this case, and the need to bring over a 
decade of litigation to a close, the Special Administrator negotiated a 
settlement of the Kennedy Action that he believed in good faith would 
benefit all heirs and interested persons under the circumstances. 
The Appellants' argument that, during the processes described above, 
Ms. Cazares' interests in the Estate were ignored lacks merit as she had no 
interest in the Estate at the time of resolution. The Appellants' argument 
that the Probate Court should not have approved the settlement in the 
Kennedy action lacks merit because the Special Administrator had full 
authority to negotiate the settlement agreement. In addition, the Special 
Administrator obtained approval from the Probate Court after providing 
notice to all heirs and interested parties and an opportunity to be heard. 
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Their argument that the Probate Court erred by refusing to fixate on one item 
of evidence to the exclusion of all other evidence is simply wrong. 
While not making one specific point and argument in response to the 
deficiencies in Appellants' Brief on appeal, the Appellee objects to these 
deficiencies and submits argument in Appellee's Brief in relation to those 
deficiencies as they appear within the context of Appellants' Brief. On this 
point alone, the Appellants' appeal should be dismissed. 
Appellee submits that the Appellants have not met their burden on 
appeal of demonstrating that the Probate Court's decision to ignore Ms. 
Cazares' claimed interests in the Estate was incorrect as a matter of law; that 
the Special Administrator failed to act reasonably for the benefit of the 
interested persons, or that the Probate Court's findings that the settlement 
agreement was just and reasonable and in the best interests of the Estate, 
were clearly erroneous; or that the Probate Court abused its discretion in 
deciding not to fixate on one piece of evidence to the exclusion of all other 
relevant evidence. The Appellee respectfully submits that the 
determinations of the Probate Court should be affirmed in every respect. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROBATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
RECOGNIZE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY ROSALIND 
CAZARES. 
Appellant Rosalind Cazares has no standing to assert that the Probate 
Court erred in approving a settlement of the heirs, paying the debts of the 
estate, and distributing the balance. In order to have standing, one must 
have "skin in the game." One who may not be adversely affected by the 
outcome of the litigation, or does not "have a legally protectible interest in 
the controversy," has no standing to raise any issue. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145 (Ut. 1973). In order to have standing, the party must show "some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of 
the legal dispute." Id. 
In this case, Appellant Rosalind Cazeres had no protectible interest in 
the estate in the proceedings below, and has no protectible interest on appeal 
now. In Cosby v. Cazares, 2010 Ut. App. 269, 20J 0 WL 3 79 J 33, (Ut. App. 
20l0)(unpublished opinion)(Addendum A), this Court upheld the decision of 
the trial court, the Honorable Robert K. Hilder presiding, which quieted all 
of Rosalind Cazares' interest in this estate in the name of Pamela Cosby 
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(daughter of Rosemary Cosby), subject only to the interest of Inheritance 
Funding Company as that claim was disclosed in the probate action. 
In the proceedings below, Judge Dever merely followed the Order of 
Judge Robert K. Hilder in Cosby v Cazares, supra, as required by law. At 
the time that Judge Dever authorized the settlement, payment of creditors in 
the Estate, and brought this case to a close, Rosalind Cazares had no interest 
in the Estate and had no standing to complain. Likewise, on appeal, 
Rosalind Cazares has no standing to complain. 
II. THE PROBATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN APPROVING A 
SETTLEMENT IN THE ANCILLARY KENNEDY ACTION-
A special administrator has the power of a general personal 
representative, except as limited by the order of appointment under Utah's 
Probate Code. Section 75-3-617. A personal representative—not an heir of 
estate—has standing to sue on behalf of the estate. Section 75-3-704(3). In 
this case, the Special Administrator was specifically directed by the Probate 
Court to represent the Estate in conjunction with the Kennedy Action, 
without limitation, and accordingly had the power in conjunction with the 
Kennedy Action to proceed as a personal representative with respect to that 
This aigument is unique to Appellant Rosalind Cazaies No claim 01 aigument is submitted by Ernest 
Walton in support of Point I of the Appellant's Bnef 
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action. Thus, the Special Administrator "acting reasonably for the benefit of 
the interested persons" had full statutory authority to enter into a reasonable 
and fair settlement of the Kennedy Action. Sections 75-3-704, 75-3-710, 
and 75-3-714 (17) &(27).16 
The Appellants argue without supporting legal authority in their Brief, 
p. 3-4, that the Probate Court improperly settled the Kennedy Action without 
knowing about the case and without an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether the settlement was fair and reasonable; that the Probate Court 
should have allowed the Kennedy Action to be consolidated with the Probate 
Case; that approval of the settlement should have awaited decision on 
Appellant Cazares second Motion to Intervene in the Kennedy Action, that 
1 7 
the Probate Court should have heard claims against Robert Cosby. 
13
 Pamela Cosby had obtained a judgment against Rosalind Cazaies and executed upon all of hei interests 
in this estate proceeding 
In fact, Piobate Couit appioval foi settling the Kennedy Action may not have been requned at all undei 
the statutes cited above Furtheimoie, undei Utah's common law, the powei of a peisonal lepiesentative to 
compromise disputes, with 01 without court appioval, has been long lecognized, and has not been 
abiogated by statute Bean v Cailos, 445 P 2d 144, 145 (Ut 1968) (pnoi court appioval unnecessaiy and 
settlements set aside only upon proof of bad faith oi fiaud) Also see Unifoim Law Comments to Section 
75-3-704 ("contemplates that peisonal lepiesentatives will pioceed with all of the business of 
administration without court oiders ") The ability of a peisonal lepiesentative oi othei fiduciaiy of a 
piobate estate to compiomise claims is essential to the ability to close an estate wheie (as in the case befoie 
the Probate Court) the hens cannot agree on any one solution to a pioblem 
17
 The Probate Court heaid many claims of alleged misconduct against Robert Cosby, laised by Appellants, 
including claims that he should be held in contempt foi failing to account foi pioperty All such claims 
weie heaid by the Piobate Court eithei in evidentialy heanngs oi othei heanngs and weie iejected 
Appellant Rosalind Cazaies then decided to commence an action foi "bieach of fiduciaiy duty" against 
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Nowhere in this litany of complaints do the Appellants cite to any law that 
requires the personal representative or the Probate Court to proceed in the 
manner that the Appellants would have preferred before the Kennedy Action 
was resolved. In fact, no such law exists. To the contrary, the Special 
Administrator had full authority to settle and resolve the dispute in any just 
and reasonable fashion. Section 75-3-714 (17) & (27). 
Moreover, the Special Administrator sought specific Probate Court 
approval of the compromise. The Special Administrator spelled out in detail 
his rationale for resolving the Kennedy Action under a compromise. That 
formula included the common sense economic analysis which demonstrated 
that the Estate was likely to be insolvent, meaning that it would have nothing 
left to distribute to heirs, even if the Kennedy Action proceeded and the 
estate won everything on appeal. The analysis further demonstrated that, if 
the Estate lost on appeal, the Estate would be administratively insolvent to 
the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars. (See Statement of Facts, \ 
11(e) supra). Under these circumstances, the Probate Court properly held 
that the settlement was reasonable. 
Robert Cosby in a separate suit before Judge Medley - and that claim was dismissed, with prejudice, 
following summary judgment. 
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Other than a laundry list of complaints about how the Appellants 
wished that the Kennedy Action were prosecuted or how the Probate Court 
should have acted, the Appellants have produced no comprehensible 
argument before this Court that would lead to the conclusion that the Probate 
Court or the Special Administrator abused their discretion, or violated 
fiduciary duties, in concluding that the compromise was reasonable. In fact, 
the compromise was a reasonable conclusion to over a decade of litigation 
involving numerous cases before the Third Judicial District Court, and 
Utah's Appellate Courts, which had ceased serving any purpose beyond that 
of a grudge match. No question exists under these circumstances that the 
Special Administrator aact[ed] reasonably for the benefit of the interested 
parties." Section 75-3-714. Accordingly, the Probate Court did not commit 
error when it approved the compromise that included dismissal of the 
Kennedy Action. 
III. THE PROBATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN VALUING 
ROSEMARY COSBY'S PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
The Probate Court conducted a formal evidentiary hearing lasting 
three days to determine the nature, extent, and value of the personal property 
of the estate from December 1 through December 3, 2008. (Docket Entries 
12/1/08-12/3/08). All interested parties and their counsel participated and 
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presented testimony and exhibits. In fact, Ms. Cazares' own counsel, 
Edward W. McBride, Jr., was designated by the Probate Court to be the 
primary advocate regarding the identification and valuation of personal 
property and he subpoenaed witnesses, presented the witnesses, introduced 
exhibits, and made arguments throughout the hearing. Following the 
hearing, the Probate Court entered an Order and Judgment. (Exhibit B 
attached; Index 5922-5826). 
In the Probate Court's Ruling and Judgment, the Probate Court 
rejected the Appellants' claim that a loan application signed by Rosemary 
and Robert Cosby dated 9/26/96, some twelve years prior to the hearing, was 
the sole evidence the Court should consider in determining the nature and 
value of the personal property of the estate. Instead, the Court considered all 
relevant evidence, including oral testimony of seven witnesses who were 
examined and cross-examined, numerous exhibits, inventories, and a report 
from the trial court's appointed Special Master, Judge Daniels, dated July 
27, 2006. Special Master Judge Daniels had previously conducted a two-day 
evidentiary hearing on July 6 and 7, 2006, where all interested parties, 
including Appellants, and their counsel participated and presented evidence 
and testimony on the real and personal property of the Estate. His report 
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was subsequently filed with and approved by the Court, with no objections 
1 O 
by interested parties. (Addendum C attached; Index 1323-1598). 
The Appellants argue on appeal that the Probate Court erred in its 
Order and Judgment by considering all relevant evidence regarding the 
nature, extent, and value of the estate's personal property instead of fixating 
on the loan application and excluding all other relevant evidence. They 
further argue that Probate Court's decision was against the weight of the 
evidence. The Appellants' arguments lack merit. 
First, the Appellant's arguments should be rejected under Rule 
11(e)(2) U.R.A.P. The Appellants have failed to provide a transcript of the 
trial court's hearing, held December 1-3, 2008, on appeal. It is impossible to 
properly respond to the merits of the Appellants' arguments due to the lack 
of a transcript, and it is not incumbent upon Appellees to supply one. 
Horton v. Gem State Mut of Utah, 19A P.2d 847, 849 (Ut. App. 1990)(non-
jury trial). It is the Appellants' burden to provide the court with an adequate 
record to present their arguments for review. Pugh v. N. Am. Warranty 
Services, Inc., 1 P.3d 570, 573 (Ut. App. 2000). And, in the absence of an 
Appellants therefore had three occasions in which to present their claims, arguments, and evidence 
regarding the personal property of the Estate. First, during a two day evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Daniels. Second, before Judge Dever when the Daniels' Report was considered and accepted by the Court. 
And, third, during a three-day evidentiary hearing before Judge Dever himself. 
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adequate record, the court should "presume that the judgment was supported 
by sufficient evidence." Horton, supra. 
Second, even if a transcript and adequate record were presented on 
appeal, the Appellants have failed to marshal any evidence is support of their 
position. Tschaggerny v. Milbanklns. Co., 163 P.3d 615, 622 (Ut. 2007). 
Bald assertions that the Probate Court failed to properly weigh the loan 
application against other evidence presented are meaningless without proper 
marshalling. 
Lastly, the Appellants offer no rule or rationality on appeal why the 
Probate Court erred in rejecting the Appellants' notion that the only relevant 
evidence on the nature, extent, and value of the estate's personal property 
consisted of the 1996 loan application. They offer no explanation why the 
other evidence considered by the Probate Court was somehow irrelevant or 
non-admissible; nor do they cite to any transcript where the Probate Court 
made rulings on objections (there are none). An appellate court may 
decline to consider an argument where a party has failed to adequately brief 
the point. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998). However, 
even if this Court were to consider the Appellants' argument, it lacks merit 
in any event. Rule 402 U.R.E. provides that "All relevant evidence is 
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admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissible." The Appellants cite no authority to support a theory that 
a court must be fixated on one item of evidence to the exclusion of all other 
relevant evidence. Trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in 
deciding whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough v. Behrers, 552 P.2d 
1286 (Ut. 1976). Here, the Probate Court did not breach its discretionan 
allowing all interested parties and their counsel to present relevant oral and 
documentary evidence, hear arguments of counsel, and consider the report 
from the court-appointed Special Master in determining the nature, extent, 
and value of the personal property. 
This Court should reject the Appellants' arguments regarding the 
Estate's personal property and affirm the Probate Court's Ruling and 
Judgment. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Probate Court did not err in refusing to recognize the alleged 
claims of Rosalind Cazares. The Probate Court did not err in approving the 
settlement in the Kennedy Action and bringing this case to a close. The 
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Probate Court did not err in valuing the personal property of the estate. The 
decisions of the Probate Court were not arbitrary or capricious and were 
fully supported by the evidence. The Probate Court's decisions should be 
affirmed and costs should be awarded to the Appellee. 
DATED: Thursday, February 17, 2011. 
fl~Jlfr PM 
DAVID O. PARKINSON 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Attorneys for Special Administrator 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DAVID 0. PARKINSON, hereby declares that he is an attorney for 
the Appellee herein; and that he served the attached BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE upon: 
Rosalind Cazares 
PRO SE PARTY 
6842 Windy Ridge Drive 
Herriman, UT 84096 
Ernest Walton 
PRO SE PARTY 
840 West Timber Creek, #1009 
Salt Lake City,, UT 84119 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the 
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the Untied States 
mail in Salt Lake City, Utah on Friday, February 18, 2011. 
Executed on Friday, February 18, 2011. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is 
true and correct. 
DAVID O. PARKINSON 
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Cosby v. Cazares, Not Reported in P.3d (2010) 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
2010 WL 3795133 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES 
BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Pamela COSBY, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rosalind E. CAZARES and Adrian 
Jefferson, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20091035-CA. Sept. 30, 2010. 
West KeySummary 
1 Execution #* Persons Who May Purchase 
Public policy did not forbid a plaintiff from 
extinguishing a defendant's claim upon an estate 
through execution and purchase of that claim 
at a constable's sale. The defendant cited Snow, 
Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, in which 
the Utah Supreme Court held that it is against 
public policy for a law firm to purchase in an 
execution sale a legal malpractice cause of action 
that has been filed against it. However, his reliance 
on Tanasse was misplaced. The plaintiff in the 
case at bar did not purchase a chose in action that 
was a claim against herself. 
\ Cazares's pro se brief is necessarily limited to addressing her 
and Jefferson did not file a brief. 
Cazares's brief adopts the undisputed facts set forth in the 
district court's judgment, adding only an assertion that Pamela 
Cosby's actions were calculated to stop the probate litigation. 
As such, Cazares's claims on appeal are limited to a challenge 
to the district court's determination that Pamela Cosby was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After concluding 
that there were no undisputed issues of material fact, the 
district court concluded that (1) Cazares's purported transfer 
of the entire estate of Rosemary Cosby to Jefferson was an 
invalid fraudulent transfer; (2) Cazares's interest in the estate 
of Rosemary Cosby was vested in her at the time of the 
constable's sale; and (3) the sale of Cazares's interest in the 
estate was not against the public interest. Accordingly, the 
district court concluded that "[t]he constable's sale of all of 
WeStlawNext (C) ?01 1 Thomson Renter*.-; Kin r ia im in Arini 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 090907838; The 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Rosalind E. Cazares, Herriman, Appellant Pro Se. 
Shawn D. Turner, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, VOROS, and ROTH. 
Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*7 Appellant Rosalind E. Cazares appeals the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Pamela 
Cosby. The judgment provided that (1) the purported transfer 
of Cazares's interest in the Estate of Rosemary Cosby to 
Adrian Jefferson is void and (2) all of Cazares's interest in 
the Estate of Rosemary Cosby Case No. 973900220ES is 
quieted in Pamela Cosby subject only to the interest of the 
Inheritance Funding Company as that claim is disclosed in the 
probate action. Although Cazares makes arguments related to 
the probate case, the case underlying this appeal concerns the 
purported conveyance of Cazares's interest in the estate to her 
son, Adrian Jefferson, and the effect of the sale of that interest 
to Pamela Cosby. 
own claims because she cannot represent Adrian Jefferson on appeal, 
Ms. Cazares's interests in the Estate of Rosemary Cosby is 
valid and title to those interests, subject to the claim of the 
Inheritance Funding Company is hereby quieted in Pamela 
Cosby." 
Cazares does not challenge the determination that her 
purported transfer of the estate of Rosemary Cosby to 
Jefferson was invalid. On appeal, she first claims that Pamela 
Cosby could not execute upon Cazares's interest in the estate 
of Rosemary Cosby because its monetary value had not been 
determined. Cazares next claims that public policy forbids 
Pamela Cosby from extinguishing Cazares's claim upon the 
estate through execution and purchase of that claim at the 
constable's sale. 
^i ! I C aci\<^rv,rf.cirv Wnrhs: 1 
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Cosby v. Cazares, Not Reported in P.3d (2010) 
Cazares argues that there could be no execution and sale of her 
interest in the estate of Rosemary Cosby because the amount 
of the interest has not been ascertained. This challenges 
the district court's conclusion that Cazares's interest in the 
estate of Rosemary Cosby was vested at the time of the 
constable's sale. Cazares cites no legal support for her 
argument. Furthermore, she herself assigned a portion of 
her interest to the Inheritance Funding Company. Because 
Cazares does not provide adequate legal or factual analysis 
of her claim, we do not consider it. "This court has routinely 
declined to consider arguments which are not adequately 
briefed on appeal." State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992); see also Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring 
argument to contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied upon). 
*2 Cazares's second claim is based upon her reading of 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999 UT 
49, 929 P.2d 351. In Tanasse, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "it is against the public policy of Utah for a law 
firm to purchase in an execution sale a legal malpractice 
cause of action that has been filed against it." Id. f 19. In 
Applied Medical Technologies v. Eames, 2002 UT 18,44 P.3d 
End of Document 
699, the supreme court described Tanasse as an exception 
to the general rule that a judgment creditor can purchase 
any nonexempt property at a sheriffs sale to satisfy the 
judgment that it has against the judgment debtor. See id. <][ 13. 
Generally, "a defendant can purchase claims, i.e., choses of 
action, pending against itself and then move to dismiss those 
claims ." Id. In Applied Medical Technologies, the supreme 
court was asked to extend the Tanasse exception to all 
judgment creditors that purchase claims against themselves. 
See id. The supreme court declined to extend the exception to 
nonlawyers who purchase claims against themselves, noting 
that the Tanasse exception was based upon its constitutional 
duty to regulate and supervise the actions of attorneys in 
the practice of law. See id. % 20. Cazares's reliance on the 
Tanasse exception is misplaced for several reasons. First, 
Pamela Cosby did not purchase a chose in action that was 
a claim against herself. Second, the purchase of Cazares's 
interest in the estate of Rosemary Cosby is not precluded 
by the limited public policy-based exception announced in 
Tanasse and interpreted in Applied Medical Technologies. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Parallel Citations 
2010 UT App 269 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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SCOTT DANIELS (A0813) 
Special Master 
Post Office Box 521328 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152 
Telephone: (801)583-0801 
Fax: (801)583-0802 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER 
OF ROSEMARY COSBY, Probate No. 973900220ES 
Deceased Judge L.A. Dever 
This matter was heard by the Special Master, beginning on July, 6, 2006 at 8:30 A.M. 
The following attorneys entered appearances: David O. Parkinson for Lee McCullough, 
Personal; Representative, J. Bruce Reading and William G. Wilson, for Robert Cosby, 
Edward W. McBride for Rosilind Cazares, Shawn D. Turner for Debra Cosby, Sam 
Cosby and Pamela Cosby. Ernest Walton represented himself. Although United Security 
was not a party, Julie A. Bryan was also present as its attorney as was Richard A. 
Rappaport for some of the time. The following heirs were present personally: Robert 
Cosby, Ernest Walton, Roslind Cazares, Sam Cosby, Debra Cosby, and Pamela Cosby. 
All of the heirs were informed that if they had any evidence relating to any claimed asset, 
it must be presented at the hearing. Nevertheless, during the coarse of the hearing, 
witnesses occasionally asserted they had other evidence, but it wasn't present in court at 
that time. 
The hearing concluded for the day at 5:15 P.M. The parties were again informed that if 
they had any evidence to present it must be brought forth in the next hearing. The hearing 
recommenced on July 10, 2006 at 5:30 P.M. Ail of the attorneys and all of heirs were 
also present on this day. Again, the heirs were informed that any evidence relating to any 
asset must be presented in order to be considered. Some of the heirs did present 
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additional evidence at this second day of hearing. The second day of hearing concluded 
at 8:45 P.M. 
All of the witnesses were placed under oath. 
The purpose of the hearing was to form a recoinmendation to the Court as to what assets 
should be included in the estate, 
STIPULATED ASSETS 
Robert Cosby submitted an INVENTORY to the court dated July 30, 1998. In the 
Special Master hearing, it was marked exhibit 3. The Parties stipulated the assets listed 
are part of the Estate, although they did not stipulate as to values. These assets are: 
14 interest in Part of Lot 2 of the HUNTSMAN PLAT "A" (with a first mortgage Trust 
Deed to Chase Manhattan Bank) 
Full interest in The North 100.00 feet of Lot 10, and the North 100.00 feet of the East 
17.50 feet of Lot 11, Block 65 Glendale Addition 
Funds in NBD Bank (the amount listed on the INVENTORY is $233.29, but a bank 
statement received in evidence indicates the accoimt balance as of January 13, 1997 was 
$3,144.83) 
Funds in Suntrust Bank. 
14K Gold Ruby & Diamond Ring 
Ladies 14 K Yellow Gold Boston Link Chain 
18K Gold Ruby & Diamond Cross 
Pearl Necklace with Diamond Clasp 
Omega Diamond Watch 
Full Length Mink Coat 
Mink jacket 
Mink Stole 
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Fox Jacket 
Fox Throw 
Misc. Hats & accessories 
The parties also stipulated that the following are assets of the Estate: 
The proceeds of the lawsuit Western Surety Company v. Robert C. Cosby 990902004, 
Third District Court. 
The real estate located 1109 West 900 South in Salt Lake City, Utah (This is apparently 
the same as the property described above as 100 feet of lot 10 and 100 feet of lot 11 in 
Glendale). (Exhibit 1) 
Certain real estate in Kern County California (exhibit 2) 
DISPUTED ASSETS 
Rosilind Cazares filed an INVENTORY LIST with the court on September 14,2000. 
She claims all of the assts listed are properly with in the estate. They arc as follows: 
1. Faith Temple Church (1). 
This is the broadest of Ms. Cazares's claims. Essentially she claims that the Faith 
Temple Church was a DBA for Rosemary Cosby and all of its assets belonged to her. 
There is insufficient evidence to support this claim. Rosemary Cosby did use many 
church assts as if they were her own and did use the church's credit to benefit heTself OT 
her friends. She also used her own credit to benefit the church. Although there was 
considerable commingling, there is no substantial credible evidence to indicate that she 
was actually the owner of the church. 
2. Southern Plantation Restaurant 
The Southern Plantation Restaurant's business license lists the Faith Temple Church as 
the owner, (ex 10) The lease for the premises lists both Faith Temple Church and 
Rosemary Cosby as the tenets, but Rosemary signed only on behalf of the church, not 
personally, (ex. 7). An invoice for restaurant equipment is in the name of'"Southern 
Plantation" and signed by Rosemary Cosby, but doesn't indicate whether it is in a 
personal or representative capacity, (ex 8). This evidence would indicate the restaurant is 
an asset owned by the church, not by Rosemary Cosby. 
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3. TLC Day Care 
The business license is also in the name of Faith Temple Church (ex. 10) There is 
insufficient evidence that this is part of the estate. 
4. TLC Gospel Records and Tapes 
There is no evidence this is an asset of the estate. 
5. KLLB AM Radio Station 
There is no evidence this is an asset of the estate. 
6. Blue Bird RV 
There is no evidence this is an asset of the estate 
7. 3188 Deer Hollow Property 
This is part of the lawsuit. 
8. 1411 Gillespie Way. 
This was sold prior to Ms. Cosby's death. 
9. 965 Libby Way 
This is part of the lawsuit. 
10. 1109 West 900 South 
This is part of the estate, and is the property described in the deed, exhibit 1. 
11. Misc. Furniture in house. 
There was a considerable amount of furniture in the various homes that were owned by 
Rosemary or jointly with Robert. Half of the furniture in the jointly owned homes was 
Robert's. He testified that he still has much of it. Robert should be required to account 
for the furniture and personal effects belonging to Rosemary. This applies to the jewelry, 
hats, furniture, and all items of personal property disposed while Robert was acting as 
personal Representative. 
12. Zions Summit Condo 
This is part of the lawsuit. 
13. Imported Art and Silver 
See Paragraph 11. 
14. Miscellaneous Jewelry and Furs 
See Paragraph 11. 
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15. Mortgages notes and cash. 
There is no evidence that the "bank account in Tuna Mississippi" or in Tunaca MI 
existed. The same is true for the "Stocks and bonds Chuckie Averitte gave to Mama," the 
safe deposit box, and the "stocks and bonds Lorenzo and Dorothy Watkins gave to 
Mama/' There was a Utah Bank account, but it was essentially a pass through account 
intended to pass Church funds to pay Robert and Rosemary's expenses. The accounts 
SunTrust and NBD accounts are part of the estate. 
16. Two buses, 1 Semi truck and moving truck 
There is no credible evidence that the vehicles listed in paragraph 16 were part of the 
estate. 
17. Faith Temple Church (II) 
Like Faith Temple Church I, there is no credible evidence that this was an asset owned by 
Rosemary Cosby. 
18. King of Kings Copies Business 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
19. Day Care Business 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
20. Kendall Inn 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. The only 
evidence is that it is owned by Faith Temple Church in Indiana. 
21. 4412 Dixon Road 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
22. 10600 North "Cannel" Residence 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
23. Two houses located behind Kendall Inn. 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
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24. Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures. 
See Paragraph 11. 
25. Black China Closet 
This was a gift to Rosemary Cosby. Robert returned it to the person who gave it to her. 
Nevertheless, it was part of estate. See paragraph 11. 
26. Land on Redwood Road 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. The only 
evidence is that it is owned by United Security Financial 
27.1955 Bryan Avenue 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
28. Sego Lilly Property 
This property is part of the lawsuit. 
29. 1805 Sir Lancelot Circle (Florida) 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
30. 4098 West 8580 South, West Jordan, Utah 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
31. United Security Financial 
The parties spent considerable time at the hearing on this issue. Therefore, I will attempt 
to summarize the evidence; 
United Security Financial is a mortgage company operated by Lois Johnson. It was 
formed as a corporation in 1988. Lois Johnson was issued 25,345 shares of stock. The 
audited financial report in that year indicated there were 25,345 shares outstanding. 
The audited financial report of 1989 indicates there were 45,345 "shares issued." This is 
true in all of the financial reports through 1996. In 1997, however, the report indicates 
there are again 25,345 shares. All subsequent reports state there are 25,345 outstanding 
shares. The 1997 report was prepared by a different accountant than the previous reports. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This was, of course, also the year that Rosemary Cosby died. Later reports were prepared 
by the same accountant who prepared the earlier reports, but he continued to report that 
there were 25,345 shares outstanding. 
This 20,000 share discrepancy is the subject of the controversy here. Lois Johnson 
produced from her file two original stock certificates. The first (numbered 1) was issued 
to Lois Johnson on December 13, 1988 for 25,345 shares. The second (numbered 2) was 
issued March 15,1989 to Lois Johnson for 20,000 shares. Both are signed by Secretary -
Treasurer Donald E. Stephenson and bear a corporate seal. This would explain the 
20,000 discrepancy, but there is another explanation. 
J. Jay Bullock, a local attorney testified at the hearing. In a previous matter, in 1993, Mr. 
Bullock had received some materials which Lois Johnson identified as part of her file. 
Mr. Bullock still had these documents. The file as he had it in 1993 contained copies of 
Lois Johnson's 25,345 share certificate (number 1) and 4 others: 1000 shares to Faith 
Temple Church (certificate 2), 11.000 shares to Rosemary Cosby (certificate 3). 2000 
shares to Demetrius Cosby (certificate 4) and 6000 to Lois Johnson (certificate 5), for a 
total of 20,000 shares. The certificate to Lois Johnson for 20,000 shares is not present. 
The certificates are signed by Donald E. Stephenson as Sccrctai*y-Trcasurci\ and he 
testified the signatures appear to be genuine. He can't remember signing any particular-
certificate, but he testified he only signed certificates in the 1988 and 89 time period and 
he has not signed any more recently. 
None of these copies include a corporate seal, not even the Lois Johnson certificate. Both 
of Lois Johnson's original certificates are sealed, but the seal itself is somewhat suspect, 
in that the seal on the second certificate is a different seal than the one used on the first 
certificate. Also, the seal on the first certificate is more smashed and therefore older 
looking than the second certificate. 
Lois Johnson testified that she made out the certificates, but never issued them or 
delivered them. The stock transfer book should be definitive on this issue, but Ms. 
Johnson testified that it has been stolen 
Therefore, the evidence can be summarized to be highly conflicting. Since neither Lois 
Johnson nor United Security Financial were parties to this litigation they cannot be bound 
by a finding herein. It is true that her testimony is highly suspect. On the other hand, 
there is no direct evidence that any certificate was ever delivered to Rosemary Cosby. No 
one claims to have seen it in her possession or heard her talk about it or claims to have 
found it after her death. The tax returns all listed Lois Johnson as the sole owner. The 
minutes of all the annual stockholder meetings indicate that Lois Johnson is the only 
stockholder. 
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32. Lamp from Bridgette Dance. 
See Paragraph 11. 
33. WRGT Radio Station radio time. 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby, 
34. Bank Account - Indiana International 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
35. Life and Health Insurance 
The proceeds from these have already been properly distributed. 
36. Sun Trust Bank 
This is an asset of the estate which Robert Cosby misappropriated. See stipulated asset 
list. 
In addition, at the hearing it was asserted that TLC Elegante was an asset of the estate. 
There is no credible evidence this was an asset owned by Rosemary Cosby. 
RECOMMENDATION 
1. All of the items on the stipulated list should be distributed as part of the estate. 
A Hearing should be held to establish their value 
2. Robert Cosby should be ordered to return to the estate the value of personal 
items taken from the estate which were cither sold or given away. He should 
have the burden of proof to establish their value. 
3. The Personal Representative should determine whether he feels it is in the best 
interest of the estate to pursue a claim that Rosemary Cosby was a partial 
owner of United Security Financial. If he feels it is in the estate's best 
interest, he should be given authority to retain counsel and advance costs for 
this purpose. 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
EXHIBIT LIST 
1. Quit Claim Deed, Glendale 
2. Assessor map, Kern County 
3. Inventory 
4. Bullock materials 
5. Rosemary Cosby credit report 
6. Southern Plantation DBA application 
7. Southern Plantation lease 
8. Southern Plantation equipment purchase 
9. Stock Certificates 
10. TLC Daycare & Southern Plantation business License 
11. Inventory 
12. USF financial Statement 1996,1995 
13. USF financial Statement 1999,1998 
14. Stock Certificate (Lois Johnson 25,345 shares) 
15. USF financial Statement 1997 
16. USF financial Statement 1998 
17. USF financial Statement 
18. USF financial Statement 
19. USF financial Statement 2000, 1999 
20. USF financial Statement 
21. USF financial Statement 
22. USF financial Statement 
23. USF financial Statement 1988 
24. USF financial Statement 1989 
25. Deed to Richards Street property 
26. Quit Claim Deed from Rosemary Cosby to Faith Pentecostal Church 
(Indiana Ave.) 
27. Quit Claim Deed from Rosemary Cosby to Faith Pentecostal Church 
28. Deed of Reconveyance 
29. Bank accounts 
30. DBA application (not received) 
31. internet information (not received) 
32. NBD Bank statement 
33. Dissolution of Business (King' Copies) 
34. Jay Bullock letter 
35. Consent of Assignment from Western Broadcasting to United Security 
Financial (KLLB) 
36. Consent to Transfer of Control from Annie L. Harris Johnson et al to Faith 
Temple Pentecostal Church. (KLLB) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Scott Daniels, certify that I served the foregoing REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER 
upon the parties by mailing to: 
Mr. David 0. Parkinson 
CALLISTER.NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
2180 South, 1300 East #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Mr. Edward W. McBride, Jr. 
BENNETT, BUHLER & McBRIDE 
10 West 300 South, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mr. J. Bruce Reading 
Mr. William G. Wilson 
SCALLY & READING 
15 W. South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Mr. Shawn D. Turner 
1218 W. South Jordan Parkway #B 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Cc: 
Ms. Julie A. Bryan 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT, & SEGAL 
257 East, 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Scott Daniels 
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David 0. Parkinson (2527) 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
A Professional Corporation 
Gateway Tower East, Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




Probate No. 973900220ES 
Judge L.A. Dever 
A hearing on this matter was held on Friday, August 11, 2006, at 10:00 a.m. before the 
Honorable L.A. Dever. Present at the hearing were the following individuals: David O. 
Parkinson, representing Leland S. McCullough, Jr., as special administrator of the estate; Edward 
W. McBride, Jr., representing Rosalind Cazares (who was also present); J. Bruce Reading, 
representing Robert C. Cosby (who was also present) and the estate of Demetrius Cosby; Shawn 
D. Turner, representing Deborah B. Cosby, Pamela Jean Cosby, and Samuel Cosby (all of whom 
were present); and Ernest Walton, pro se. All of the living heirs of the estate were present. 
472279.1 
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Upon consideration of: 
A. The Report of Special Master, prepared by Scott Daniels and dated July 27, 2006 
(the "Report"), a copy of which appears in the file of this case; 
B. Recommendations prepared by David O. Parkinson with respect to the assets of 
the estate as listed in the Report; 
C. The Petition for Approval of Fees and Costs and For Determination of Allowable 
Fees and Costs filed by Leland S. McCuUough, Jr., as Special Administrator of the Estate, and 
dated July 18, 2006, with the accompanying Affidavit of Personal Representative and Special 
Administrator Fees and Costs and the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs; 
D. The invoice prepared by Scott Daniels for services rendered in connection with 
the preparation of the Report, dated July 31,2006, in the sum of $5,115.00; and 
E. Following discussion in open Court, the Court finds that: 
1. The required notice has been given or waived. 
2. Venue is proper. 
ASSETS IN THE ESTATE OF ROSEMARY COSBY 
3. None of the parties challenged the Report. 
4. Mr. Parkinson reviewed the various assets listed on the Report, and it was agreed 
that the following action would be taken with respect to the indicated assets (the numbers 
correspond to the numbers utilized by Mr. Daniels in the Report): 
a. Asset No. 2: Lot 10 and a portion of Lot 11 in the Glendale Subdivision: 
Property will be sold as soon as possible at fair market value. Robert C. 
2 
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Cosby will be given an opportunity to purchase the property prior to sale 
to a third party. 
b. Assets Nos. 5 through 14: Each asset will be paid for by Robert C. Cosby. 
An effort will be made to divide the jewelry and furs among the children. 
c. Asset No. 15: Miscellaneous hats and accessories: No further action will 
be taken with to these items. 
d. Asset No. 18: Real property located in Kern County, California: Property 
will be sold as soon as possible at fair market value. 
e. Assets Nos. 22. 24. 25. 27. 28 and 31: Will be included on a list of assets 
which will describe the asset, given an approximate age of the asset, the 
condition of the asset, and the approximate value of the asset. The Black 
China Closet listed as asset number 28 will be left with the individual who 
received it, as will the lamp identified as asset number 31, but the values 
will be included on the asset list. 
POTENTIAL CLAIM FOR INTEREST IN UNITED SECURITY FINANCIAL 
5. Mr. Parkinson is reluctant to pursue the potential claim of the estate (Asset No. 31 
in the Report) against Lois Johnson and United Security Financial ("United Security") for an 
interest in United Security, for the following reasons: 
a. 83.3% of the beneficial interest in the estate (comprised of the intestate 
shares of Robert C. Cosby (50% of the estate) and Demetrius Cosby, 
Deborah B. Cosby, Pamela Jean Cosby, and Samuel Cosby (8.333% each)) 
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were not interested in pursuing a claim against Lois Johnson and United 
Security. 
b. Claims for legal fees incurred on behalf of the estate currently amount to 
approximately $250,000.00, and additional litigation may eliminate 
entirely any distribution to the heirs. 
c. Mr. Parkinson has not seen any evidence that makes it clear that Rosemary 
Cosby ever actually received a stock certificate or other evidence of an 
interest in United Security. 
6. Although Mr. Parkinson does not want to pursue a claim against Lois Johnson or 
United Security Financial, he is aware that Rosalind Cazares and Ernest Walton feel strongly that 
there is a claim against United Security Financial and that they desire to pursue the claim. 
7. Mr. Parkinson recommended that the interest of the estate in any claim against 
United Security Financial be assigned to Rosalind Cazares and Ernest Walton to allow them to 
pursue the claim if they so choose. 
8. Robert C. Cosby consented to the assignment to Rosalind Cazares and Ernest 
Walton of his interest in any claim by the estate against Rosalind Cazares. Deborah B. Cosby, 
Pamela Jean Cosby and Samuel Cosby did not consent to the assignment to Rosalind Cazares 
and Ernest Walton of their respective interest in any claim against United Security. 
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PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF FEES AND COSTS AND FOR DETERMINATION OF 
ALLOWABLE FEES AND COSTS 
9. The Petition for Approval of Fees and Costs and for Determination of Allowable 
Fees and Costs was heard as part of the regularly scheduled probate calendar on Wednesday, 
August 9, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. 
10. Because of a potential objection from Mr. McBride and at the request of Mr. 
Parkinson, the Petition was referred to the trial calendar for consideration at this hearing. 
11. The estate has received claims for payment of legal fees and costs amounting to 
more than $250,000.00. 
12. Most of the claims for fees and costs are attributable to work done in the suit 
brought by Rosalind Cazares against Robert C. Cosby and Lois Johnson, Case No. 990902004 
(the "Cosby Case"). 
13. Based on the Affidavit filed by Rosalind Cazares in the Cosby Case, Judge 
Lubeck awarded attorneys' fees to Rosalind Cazares in the following amounts, subject to a ten 
percent (10%) reduction from the amount shown: 
ATTORNEY/FIRM AMOUNT 
Joseph Nemelka $ 4,131.63 
Campbell, Moxley & Campbell 43,746.97 
Robert Booker & Associates 2, 790.00 
Nielson & Senior 1, 153.00 
Edward Garrett 49,543.06 
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Otto & McBride, PC 90.997.50 
TOTAL $193,363.15 
14. With respect to each of the claims listed in the Affidavit of Rosalind Cazares, and 
notwithstanding the decision of Judge Lubeck, there has been no finding by the Court in either 
the Cosby Case or this probate case of: 
a. Whether the fees claimed are properly payable by the estate or by Rosalind 
Cazares and/or Ernest Walton, individually, or by Robert C. Cosby; 
b. Whether the claim has been timely presented to the estate as required by 
Section 75-3-802 of the Utah Code Annotated; 
c. Whether the claim is in proper form; and 
d. The priority for payment of those claims with respect to which a Notice of 
Lien was filed as among themselves and with respect to those claims for 
which no Notice of Lien was filed. 
FEES AND COSTS OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
15. None of the parties objected to payment of the Special Administrator fees and 
costs in the amount of $605.20 as set forth in the Affidavit of Personal Representative and 
Special Administrator Fees and Costs filed by Leland S. McCullough, Jr. for the period from 
April 1,2006 through June 30, 2006. 
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FEES AND COSTS OF COUNSEL FOR SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
16. None of the parties objected to payment of the attorneys' fees and costs in the 
amount of $20,447.00 as set forth in the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed by David O. 
Parkinson for the period from April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006. 
SALE OF DEER HOLLOW PROPERTY 
17. At the hearing held before the Court on May 11, 2006, the Court ordered the sale 
of the residence and real property located at 3188 Deer Hollow Drive in Sandy, Utah (the "Deer 
Hollow Property"). 
18. Mr. Parkinson stated that in order to proceed with the sale of the Deer Hollow 
Property, it was necessary to obtain a Release of Lien from Edward M. Garrett and from Edward 
W. McBride, Jr., and that he, Mr. Garrett, Mr. McBride and Mr. Reading had entered into a 
Stipulation providing that the estate's portion of the sale proceeds would be deposited into the 
firm trust account of the law firm of Callister Nebeker & McCuUough, to be disbursed only upon 
court approval. A copy of the Stipulation is in the Court's file. 
19. The Deer Hollow Property has been sold and that portion of the equity allocable to 
the estate was placed in a trust account with the law firm of Callister Nebeker & McCuUough. 
FEES AND COSTS OF EDWARD W. MCBRIDE, JR. 
20. Mr. McBride asserted that of the $90,000.00 in fees he was awarded in the Cosby 
litigation matter, some portion, if not all, of the services were rendered on behalf of the estate 
and, therefore, he was entitled to be paid from the estate. 
21. Because the parties objected to payment of the full $90,000.00 of Mr. McBride's 
fees from the proceeds of the sale of the Deer Hollow Property, Mr. McBride will accept the sum 
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of $40,000.00 and will release his interest in the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Deer 
Hollow Property. Mr. Reading, Mr. Turner and Ernest Walton agreed to this proposal 
22. Mr. Parkinson agreed with Mr. McBride's proposal, provided that any future 
distributions to Mr. McBride will require Court approval and a finding that payment is 
appropriate in light of the issues raised in the Petition filed by Mr. McCullough seeking a 
determination of allowable fees and costs. 
23. Mr. McBride clarified that he was not releasing his interest in the proceeds from 
the sale of any other estate asset. 
FEES AND COSTS OF EDWARD M. GARRETT 
24. Mr. Garrett also provided legal services to Rosalind Cazares in conjunction with 
her claim against Robert C. Cosby and Lois Johnson, but was not present in the Court and has 
not yet petitioned the Court in the probate matter for payment of any fees or costs. 
FEES AND COSTS FROM THE COSBY LITIGATION 
25. Mr. Parkinson discussed the claims for legal fees and costs which had arisen as a 
result of the Cosby litigation and the difficulty of determining what portion, if any, of the fees 
and costs incurred in the Cosby litigation should be paid out of the probate estate at this point in 
time. 
26. Mr. Parkinson recommended to the Court that any action by the probate court on 
the legal fees and costs incurred in the Cosby litigation be deferred until the judgment in the 
Cosby litigation is finalized and any issues regarding legal fees and costs are resolved on appeal. 
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FEES AND COSTS FOR SCOTT DANIELS 
27. Mr. Parkinson presented to the Court for approval an invoice dated July 31, 2006, 
from Scott Daniels for his services provided as Special Master in the preparation of the Report. 
There were no objections to payment of the invoice. 
THEREFORE, 
1. The Report prepared by Scott Daniels will stand as written. 
2. Robert C. Cosby shall prepare an inventory of the following items, providing the 
following information with respect to each item: miscellaneous furniture and personal items, 
imported art and silver, miscellaneous jewelry and furs, miscellaneous furniture and fixture, 
Black China Closet, and lamp received from Bridgette Dance. 
3. Those items on the attached list of jewelry and furs which cannot be located will 
be purchased by Robert C. Cosby for the amount indicated. 
4. Any of the jewelry or furs listed on the accompanying pages shall be established 
by appraisal. If the item has already been appraised, no new appraisal is necessary. 
5. With respect to any claim by the estate against United Security Financial, Mr. 
McBride shall prepare a Memorandum to the Court discussing the rights of heirs of an estate if 
the estate waives its interest in a claim. 
6. The personal representative and special administrator's fees and costs in the 
amount of $605.20 are reasonable under the circumstances of the case and are hereby approved 
and shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the Deer Hollow Property presently held in 
trust by the law firm of Callister Nebeker & McCullough. 
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7. The attorneys' fees and costs submitted by David 0. Parkinson in the amount of 
$20,447.00 are reasonable under the circumstances of this care and are hereby approved and shall 
be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the Deer Hollow Property presently held in trust by the 
law firm of Callister Nebeker & McCullough. 
8. Attorneys' fees and costs for Edward W. McBride, Jr. in the amount of 
$40,000.00 are hereby approved and shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the Deer 
Hollow Property presently held in trust by the law firm of Callister Nebeker & McCullough. 
9. Prior to payment of future legal fees from the probate estate to Mr. McBride, the 
fees will be subject to review by the Court for a determination as to the appropriateness of 
payment. 
10. The fees and costs of Special Master are hereby approved and shall be paid from 
the proceeds of the sale of the Deer Hollow Property presently held in trust by the law firm of 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough. 
11. With the exception of Edward M. Garrett, payment of other legal fees and costs 
incurred in connection with the litigation will wait until the litigation is resolved and the court 
has an opportunity to determine the appropriateness of payment. 
12. Edward M. Garrett will prepare and present a claim to the Court regarding his 
representation of Rosalind Cazares, and the Court will determine the amount, if any, of payment 
to Mr. Garrett from the Trust Account. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ernest Walton, Pro Se 
Shawn D. Turner, Attorney for Deborah B. 
Cosby, Pamela Jean Cosby, Samuel Cosby 
ice Reading, Attomey^&rKoEert C. 
by and the Estate of Demetrius Cosby 
fl-^afcA— 
David O. Parkinson, Attorney for Leland S. 
McCullough, special administrator 
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